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A POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
OF UNITED STATES v. NIXON 
William Van Alstyne* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of '71, it was the Pentagon Papers case1 that 
dramatized the claims of Richard Nixon in the Supreme Court 
of the United States. In the summer of '74, it was United States 
v. Nixon. 2 Politically, the realignment of the President from 
plaintiff to defendant said more than anything else about what had 
happened in the meantime: from the party on whose behalf the 
"United States" had gone to court in 1971, to the party against 
whom the "United States" was seeking judicial assistance in 1974. 
Indeed, it is really in the political symbolism of the two 
cases that their greater significance may be found, for each, albeit 
in a different way, was something of a constitutional anti-climax. 
Each entered the Supreme Court on expedited review. Each was 
publicized as framing a question of grave constitutional signifi-
cance. In each, the Supreme Court rejected Mr. Nixon's extra-
ordinary view of executive power-but on such closely qualified 
grounds as scarcely to disturb any precedent or to cause any ripple 
in constitutional theory. 
In the Pentagon Papers case, the outcome turned on a finding 
that Congress had not deemed it necessary to safeguard classified 
information by the additional means of authorizing prior restraint 
of newspaper publication through executive application for federal 
court injunctions; thus there was no statutory basis for the relief 
the President had sought. The case was doubtless significant in 
not accepting a more permissive view of the executive interest, 
but in no sense can it be said to have belittled the executive power 
as that power was understood the day before the decision can1e 
down. In that respect, the case was a constitutional anti-climax. 
In United States v. Nixon, the outcome turned upon a close 
and conscientious assessment that likewise cannot be said to have 
• Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. 
1 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
2 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974). 
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diminished the executive power as it had previously been under-
stood. On the one side there was the particularity of the Special 
Prosecutor's subpoena, the prima facie relevance and admissibil-
ity of the material he sought, and the lack of alternative means 
to satisfy his need adequately to prepare for a scheduled federal 
criminal trial in which it would be his burden to establish each 
element of the several felony offenses beyond reasonable doubt. 
On the other side, there was the unqualified refusal by the Presi-
dent to yield the material even for in camera examination3 by the 
district judge who might thereafter preserve the confidentiality of 
some or all of it, after assessing the possibility that its prosecutor-
ial importance should be subordinated to executive interests that 
might somehow be compromised by its trial use. Essentially, 
acceptance of the executive claim at that stage would have been 
tantamount to the abdication of judicial review since the court 
was asked to uphold the claim of privilege without opportunity to 
examine the material itself. The refusal to acknowledge any 
larger role for the judiciary was pressed in these nearly absolute 
terms, moreover, even though it was not alleged that interests of 
national security or of foreign relations were in any way involved. 
It was realistically not surprising, therefore, that the Su-
preme Court would reject the claim of executive privilege under 
the circumstances, even while acknowledging the legitimacy of 
executive concerns and making provision for the protection of the 
material during the time that the district court would have it to 
examine. The opinion by the Chief Justice is exceptionally re-
strained and deferential, and the holding is a narrow one. Like 
the Pentagon Papers case, United States v. Nixon is doubtless 
significant in not accepting a more permissive view of the execu-
tive power, but in no sense can it be said to have belittled that 
power. 
If there is error in the opinion on the issue of executive priv-
ilege, it may not have been in the outcome of the case, but only 
in the largesse of certain dicta. Not since Chief Justice Vinson's 
opinion in United States v. Reynolds,4 which drew a sharp dissent 
by Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, and Black, had the Court is-
sued an oblique invitation to the President to throttle judicial re-
view by presenting a claim of executive privilege in the cellophane 
wrapper of "national security." Yet, here it is again, in United 
States v. Nixon, as a negative pregnant: 
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sen-
sitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept 
3 Respondent's Brief at 72-82, United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 
(1974). 
4 345 u.s. 1 (1953). 
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the argument that even the very important interest in con-
fidentiality of presidential communications is significantly di-
minished by production of such material for in camera in-
spection .... 5 
The reiteration from Reynolds was unnecessary. It is surprising 
that it drew no disclaimer from any other Justice. Ironically, it 
may even imply that Mr. Nixon would have prevailed in the case 
had he once again incanted the magical words of "national se-
curity." 
Similarly, while I agree with the view that executive privi-
lege may well have "constitutional underpinnings" as suggested 
by the Court in United States v. Nixon, 6 Chief Justice Burger's 
footnoted reference to McCulloch v. Maryland, 7 in support of that 
observation, may need heavy qualification. Otherwise the reader 
might reasonably suppose that the Chief Justice meant that the 
President possesses a general grant of implied, incidental power 
(including that of confidentiality) fully as broad as what the nec-
essary-and-proper clause commits to Congress by express pro-
vision, rather than that the President may necessarily possess 
some essential but very narrow zone of implied power without 
which he would be quite unable to perform his express duties at 
all. 
But surely the reference to McCulloch v. Maryland did not 
mean to read into article II an implied equivalent of the necessary-
and-proper clause which is found only in article I. Indeed, the 
necessary-and-proper clause in article I itself forbids any such 
inference to be drawn from the silence of article II. Thus, the 
clause provides in full (and note particularly the secol"\d half of 
the clause): 
[Congress shall have power] to make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the fore-
going Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution 
in the Government of .the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof. 8 
It would appear to be plain from this provision that insofar as 
some larger zone of executive privilege might by Congress be 
deemed appropriate and expedient for the President to have, more 
generous by far than what a court would regard as a minimal 
privilege indispensable to the performance of the President's ex-
press constitutional powers (e.g., a privilege of confidentiality re-
specting specific troop locations during a time of military emer-
gency as an indispensable incident of his express power as Com-
5 94 S. Ct. at 3107 (emphasis added). 
6 Id. at 3106. 
7 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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mander in Chief), the necessary-and-proper clause permits Con-
gress to provide for that more generous zone of privilege. But 
precisely because the Constitution expressly commits all such ques-
tions of executive convenience and expedieney solely to Congress 
and leaves nothing to inference or implication from the silence of 
article II, there is no room left for any court to analogize any 
broadly implied power of executive privilege from article II itself. 
I have no doubt, however, that others contributing to this 
symposium will write at greater length on the Supreme Court's 
treatment of the executive privilege claim, and as I am troubled 
by that treatment only in respect to its dicta, in this Article I think 
it useful to concentrate on two other matters. The first of these 
is to distinguish United States v. Nixon from any other case in 
recent Supreme Court history by noting the utterly remarkable 
political effects of its most minor features. Essentially, these are 
the effects which I believe sprang at once from the timing, the 
unanimity, the inescapable aptness of its reasoning to the con-
current impeachment hearings, and from the fortuitous result of 
the very last sentence in the case. To be sure, this is not a con-
ventional academic critique, and much of it is already an obvious 
fact of public understanding. Still, the connections of these enor-
mous political events with what might otherwise properly be re-
garded as an· unremarkable case on executive privilege deserve 
to be chronicled while they are still fresh. 
The second matter is well within the field of academic cri-
tique, however, even though it, too, may bear profoundly on the 
long term political effects of this case. I mean to address the 
manner in which the Supreme Court presumed to affirm the is-
suance of judicial process9 to assist a purely executive function in 
spite of the President's clear manifestation to the district court 
that, as President, he did not desire that assistance. There is rea-
son to be concerned that United States v. Nixon may be seen as 
a case which implicitly acknowledges in Congress some power to 
"particle-ize" the executive power of the United States, and I do not 
think that suggestion should be allowed to pass without extended 
comment. 
In this respect, I especially regret that this symposium will 
not have the 'benefit of the separate views of Professor Alexander 
Bickel, 10 and of course I have no idea whether he will find my own 
9 94 S. Ct. at 3100-02. 
10 See Bickel, On Mr. Jaworski's Quarrel with Mr. Nixon, N.Y. Times, 
May 23, 1974, at 39, col. 1 (city ed.), and id., June 3, 1974, at 30, col. 3 
(city ed.). Compare the views of Professor Paul Bator, Disputing Mr. St. Clair 
on the Jurisdictional Issue, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1974, at 37, col. 1 (city ed.). 
See also Albert & Simon, Enforcing Subpoenas Against the President: The Ques-
tion of Mr. Jaworski's Authority, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 545 (1974). 
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approach at all acceptable. But the question is an important one, 
and I am convinced that the Supreme Court failed to appreciate 
the full implications of what appeared at the time as a perfectly 
ordinary matter of "standing" and "justiciability." 
II. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
United States v. Nixon 
A. The "Puzzling" Unanimity of the Result and of the Absence 
of Separate Opinions 
Unanimity of decision in this case, unaccompanied by even 
separate concurring opinions, is superficially very odd. It seems 
doubtful that there could have been no seriously different shades 
of opinion within this Nixon/Warren Court on any of the several 
questions which were examined. As a suggestion that the sole 
opinion by the Chief Justice ought not necessarily be read as the 
exact expression of each member of the Court in any future con-
sideration of those issues, it may be well to look very closely at 
the circumstances of the case to remember what overriding rea-
son might have persuaded the several Justices to forego the value 
of any separate opinions. 
In the Pentagon Papers case, an equivalent testing of judicial 
views respecting the scope of executive powers, the Court was 
divided among the maximum number of possible opinions: nine. 
In United States v. United States District Court, 11 an equivalent 
testing of judicial views respecting executive exemption from the 
restraints of the fourth amendment, the Court reflected four differ-
ent views even in reaching unanimity on the outcome. Even with-
out more/ 2 the appearance of but one opinion, by the Chief Jus-
tice for the entire Court, had all of the political earmarks of what 
had seldom been achieved since the circumstances of Brown v. 
Board of Education13 twenty years before. 
It was to be expected .that one or another Justice (including 
the Chief Justice) was reasonably likely to dissent merely on pro-
cedural grounds and to declare that the case should not have been 
heard at this time on the merits.14 They might have done so 
either because: (a) the order by Judge Sirica was not technically 
11 407 u.s. 297 (1972). 
12 E.g., the very day following the release of United States v. Nixon, the 
Court issued its decision in the Detroit School Case (Milliken v. Bradley, 94 
S. Ct. 3112 ( 1974) ), dividing five to four, with five separate opinions. 
13 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
14 Compare the Chief Justice's opinion in New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 748 (1971), with that in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 
( 1971), and his agreement with the action of Justice Marshall in Schlesinger v. 
Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1~21 ( 1973 ). 
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a "final" one; or (b) the court of appeals had not reviewed the 
case, or, more plausibly, (c) a decision at the moment might 
necessarily have some untoward consequences in the impeach-
ment proceedings of the House of Representatives, no matter what 
the Court might do in attempting to limit a decision on the mer-
its.15 Those "political" effects would be avoidable simply by hold-
ing the case over until the next October term (or by remand to 
the court of appeals), without serious possibility of prejudice to 
the scheduled trial of September 9, 1974,16 which could readily 
be continued. Not weighty objections, perhaps, but not more 
frivolous than what had been persuasive to some in the Pentagon 
Papers case. 
Similarly, one might have expected one or more Justices 
(again including the Chief Justice) to be agreeable to Mr. St. 
Clair's additional argument that the Special Prosecutor's interest 
was inadequate, since the interest he represented was solely an 
executive one to which the President had asserted his superior 
authority as Chief Executive.17 Plainly the President had made 
manifest to the district court that he did not wish the assistance· 
of judicial process to secure certain evidence for prosecutive use, 
an interest which the Court itself acknowledged to be exclusively 
executive.18 The criminal defendants' claims had not been passed 
upon by the district court, and they were not parties in the case 
before the Supreme Court. Therefore, as between the only par-
ties who were in co,urt there was no equality of authority in pre-
suming to say whether the executive interest of the United States 
would be better served if the court would decline to issue a sub-
poena than if it would agree to issue the subpoena. Obviously, 
the court should have deferred to the superior executive authority 
of the President of the United States: The President had made 
plain that he did not believe any executive interest would be ad-
vanced by issuance of the subpoena, and there simply was no 
other interest whatever to serve as a basis for issuing that sub-
poena. 
Viewed in this manner, the issue was not at all whether the 
President (or the Attorney General) might delegate some portion 
of the executive power. Without denying in the least that ele-
ments of that power might be delegated (whether to promote the 
appearance of justice, to mollify Congress, or simply on grounds 
15 See Record at 51, 55-56 (argument of Mr. St. Clair), United States v. 
Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Record]. 
16 United States v. Mitchell, (Crim. No. 74-110 D.D.C. filed Mar. 1, 
1974 ). 
17 See Record, supra note 15, at 62-65 (argument of Mr. St. Clair). 
vi 94 S. Ct. at 3101. 
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of executive expediency), the existence of an outstanding and un-
revoked agency is in no sense inconsistent with the executive su-
periority of the President when a district court is confronted with 
conflicting assertions of what constitutes the executive interest in 
a given case. Does the President have a superordinate authority 
definitively to assert the executive interest of the United States 
in its own courts, or does he not? Implicit in the Supreme Court's 
decision is the conclusion that "he does not," but rather, that he 
must instead either attempt to "revoke" the authority of the Spe-
cial Prosecutor or to fire him outright. Why that should be so 
(and nothing provided by the cases cited by the Court supplies 
an answer), however, goes wholly unexplained. 19 One might very 
well have expected at least a clarifying concurring opinion, if not 
an outright dissent. 
On the other side, i.e., insofar as the Chief Justice's sole 
opinion for the Court was more favorable to the "constitutional 
underpinnings" and the scope of executive privilege than one 
would think could honestly command the uniform agreement of 
all of the Justices, 20 this, too, might have been expected to draw 
disclaimers in separate opinions. And while each of these reasons 
is itself speculative, it is clear that the unanimity of the opinion 
was exceptional in light of the divisions which have so frequently 
riven the Nixon/Warren Court. 
The opinion in United States v. Nixon suffers intellectually 
from the fact of that unanimity in many of the same ways as 
Brown v. Board of Education21 in which the Supreme Court may 
have willingly composed its marginal differences two decades ago. 
Once agreement on the merits of the basic issue was reached (as 
I do not doubt that it was), there was a very compelling reason 
to forego individual expressions of marginal difference in the com-
mon interest of sustaining the Supreme Court itself as an institu-
tion and to minimize the risk of noncompliance with its decision. 
That risk was not trivial and therefore it was not necessarily 
wrong for the Court to proceed as it did. My point is only that one 
19 For obvious reasons the President might not wish to fire a subordinate, 
or otherwise to revoke his general agency, and the President may in some mea-
sure even be restrained by an Act of Congress from doing so insofar as the 
power of removal or revocation cannot themselves be said to be indispensable to 
the exercise of presidential executive supremacy. Precisely because that is so, 
however, neither is it at all clear why anyone would think that the power of 
presidential executive supremacy could only be asserted by discharge or by revo-
cation, rather than directly, by a personal and direct manifestation of the Presi-
dent's will in the district court itself. See section III of this Article, infra. 
20 See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
21 347U.S.483 (1954). 
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may recognize the circumstances of the case and, accordingly, not 
regard its every phrase as the last possible word on the subject. Not 
only had much been made in the popular press of the President's 
pregnant refusal to affirm his earlier statements that he would 
abide by a "definitive" holding, and of the stoic silence of Mr. St. 
Clair in declining comment on what response the President might 
make in the event of an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court, 
but there was the following delicate exchange in the course of 
the oral argument itself: 
Question: You are submitting the matter rto this Court-
Mr. St. Clair: To this Court under .a special showing on be-
half of the President-
Question: And you are still leaving it up to this Court to de-
cide it. 
Mr. St. Clair: Yes, in a sense. 
Question: In what sense? 
Mr. St. Clair: In the sense that this Court has. the obligation 
to determine the law. The President also has an obligation 
to carry out his constitutional duties. 
Question: Well, do you agree that that is what is before this 
Court, and you are submitting it to this Courrt for decision? 
Mr. St. Clair: This is being submitted to this Court for its 
guidance and judgment with respect to the law. The Presi-
dent, on the other hand, has his obligations under the Consti-
tution. 
Question: Are you submitting it to this Court for this Court's 
decision? 
Mr. St. Clair: As to what the law is, yes.22 
It may be doubtful, of course, whether the President actually 
would have declined to comply with the decision even had it been 
supported by a less impressive vote, or even had it come with some 
concurring opinions disclaiming agreement with the opinion for 
this Court. On the evening of July 24th, following public re-
lease of the decision, the first political effect took hold. Mr. St. 
Clair announced that the President intended to comply "fully" 
with the decision. The unanimity of the Court and the absence 
of separate opinions, achieved at some cost to a fuller examina-
tion of the issues, helped to insure that this would be so. 
B. The Conjunction of Timing, Unanimity, and Ratio Decidendi, 
and Their Impact upon the Impeachment of the President 
Within one week of the decision, the ratio decidendi of the 
Supreme Court's opinion had contributed significantly to two 
parts of the House Judiciary Committee's proposed articles of 
22 Record, supra note 15, at 60-61 (emphasis added). 
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impeachment as well, in my view, as influencing the overall mood 
of the Committee's deliberations. Mr. St. Clair's prophecy23 that 
these kinds of effects would be inevitable if the Court were not 
to postpone the decision, or remand the case, was fulfilled. 
To be sure, even prior to the decision there was a faint pos-
sibility that the House Committee, having declined to press its 
own subpoenas against the President through the courts, might 
nonetheless presume to characterize his resistance as itself a "high 
crime" or "misdemeanor." Without the benefit of the powerful 
analogical reasoning provided by United States V. Nixon, how-
ever, it was at best a remote possibility: The presumption of the 
House to resolve a conflict of constitutional claims in its own 
favor and to impeach a President simply for the view he took of 
the law is too reminiscent of the abortive impeachment of Andrew 
Johnson to suppose that it would have carried very far. Never-
theless, within a week of the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion 
in United States v. Ni~on, the possibility was twice realized. 
The second most senior Republican member of the Com-
mittee (McClory of Illinois) personally sponsored an additional 
article of impeachment, based solely upon the President's un-
tested claim. The article charged that ,the ·President, "willfully 
disobeyed" the legitimate processes of the Committee, "inter-
posed the powers of the Presidency against the lawful subpoenas 
of the House of Representatives," and thereby committed an im-
peachable offense. 24' 
Earlier, moreover, in the course of considering the first pro-
posed article of impeachment (the coverup, "obstruction of jus-
tice" article), Congressman Danielson of California proposed an 
amendment related to the same subject. The theory of his amend-
ment was that the President's continuing resistance to the Com-
mittee's subpoenas was not even in good faith; that it was, rather, 
an additional means by which the President sought to conceal 
the criminal wrongdoings of his own agents and advisors. 25 It is 
difficult to imagine that either the Danielson amendment or the 
separate McClory article of impeachment (which carried by the 
narrow margin of twenty-one to seventeen) would have been 
adopted without the encouragement that United States v. Nixon 
implicitly provided. The decision simply destroyed whatever 
strength the President's claim to resist the Committee previously 
possessed and made it inexplicable that he would still persist. 
Prior to the decision, the President's claim of absolute ex-
23 !d. at 55-56 (argument of Mr. St. Clair). 
24 N.Y. Times, July 31, 1974, at 1, col. 7 (city ed.). 
25 Id., July 28, 1974, at 34, col. 4 (eity ed.). 
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ecutive privilege already appeared weak against the extraordinary 
and unique authority of the impeachment power, the explicit con-
stitutional agency of executive accountability for "high crimes" or 
"misdemeanors"-weaker, indeed, than his claim against the more 
limited responsibilities of the Special Prosecutor. Following the 
decision, it required no extravagant analogical fancy to appreciate 
the manner in which the President's claim against the impeach-
ment discovery. powers of the House of Representatives had been 
diminished to the vanishing point, no matter how circumspectly 
the Court itself might disavow any expression about that separate 
controversy. 
That point had been made in the course of the oral argu-
ment in United States v. Nixon itself, 26 indicating the hopelessness 
of Mr. St. Clair's task of claiming absolute privilege both in the 
courts and in Congress. In the course of that argument, Mr. St. 
Clair was obliged to argue that the fact that the federal grand 
jury had named the President as an unindicted co-conspirator 
should be disregarded entirely by the Court in determining 
whether executive privilege would apply to withhold the sixty-
four subpoenaed tapes from the Special Prosecutor-that it could 
p.ot be used to diminish the presumption that the claim of privi-
lege was appropriate and made in good faith because it was im-
proper for a federal grand jury to identify the President as a 
criminal co-conspirator. Specifically, Mr. St. Clair observed: 
"[T]he President we sugge8t cannot be indicted, cannot be named 
as a co-conspirator because that is an assumption of a legislative 
function under the Constitution."27 What "legislative" function 
of criminal accountability was it that the grand jury thus pre-
sumed to usurp? Obviously, said Mr. St. Clair, "that the process 
that is available ... is the process of impeachment."28 
Moments later, in the course of the same argument (portions 
of which were carried in the newspapers and later referred to by 
members of ;the Judiciary Committee), the awkwardness of Mr. 
St. Clair's position that executive privilege is absolute against the 
Special Prosecutor and equally absolute against the impeachment 
discovery power of Congress became apparent in the following 
embarrassing exchange: 
Question: How are you going to impeach him if you don't 
know about it? [i.e., if Congress is also barred by execu-
tive privilege from securing the necessary evidence of presi-
dential wrongdoing]. 
Mr. St. Clair: Well, if you know about it, then you oan state 
the case. If you don't know about it, you don't have it. 
26 Record, supra note 15, at 107-08. 
27 Jd. at 89. 
28 Jd. at 90 (emphasis added). 
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Question: So there you are. You're on the prongs of a 
dilemma;huuh? 
Mr. St. Clair: No, I don't think so. 
Question: If you know the President is doing something 
wrong, you can impeach him; but .the only way you can find 
out is this way; you can't impeach him, so you don't impeach 
him.. You lose me some place along there. 
[Laughter.]29 
Only the emphasis has been added to this excerpt from the tran-
script of oral argument. The transcript itself reports the "laugh-
ter." The point could hardly have been lost on the House Ju-
diciary Committee's thirty-eight lawyer members sixteen days later 
when the Court's unanimous decision came down as the Com-
mittee was meeting for the first time in public session to consider 
its own case. 
Circumspect as the opinion was, moreover, its own applica-
bility to impeachment, by analogy, was unavoidable. To be sure, 
the Court noted that not even the Special Prosecutor would ne-
cessarily receive all of the tapes he had subpoenaed;30 it affirmed 
Judge Sirica only insofar as the District Court could examine the 
materials in camera, with due regard to any particularized claims 
of privilege as to specific portions, as against the Special Prose-
cutor's alleged trial needs. It also took the unusual precaution 
of adding a section to its opinion (section "E") reminding the 
district judge of "his responsibility to see to it that until released 
to the Special Prosecutor no in camera material is revealed to 
anyone."31 The Court explained the propriety of this procedure 
with a reference to Marbury v. Madison;32 "[i}t is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is,"33 a remark that would encourage some members of the 
House Judiciary Committee to object to the McClory article.34 
The Committee had not submitted its claim against the President 
to the courts but was, rather, presuming itself to "say what the 
law is."35 
29 /d. at 108 (emphasis added). 
30 94 S. Ct. at 3110. 
31 /d. at 3111. 
32 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
33 /d. at 177. 
34 N.Y. Times, July 31, 1974, at 14, col. 3 (city ed.). 
35 The presumption of the Judiciary Committee, to resolve its own consti-
tutional claim in its own favor and to characterize the President's persistence in 
maintaining his own view as a "high crime" or "misdemeanor," may have dis-
turbing consequences especially since the proposed third article of impeachment 
does not allege that the President's claim was made in bad faith. Unlike the 
Danielson amendment to the proposed first article of impeachment, it charac-
terized the President's resistance per se as a "high crime" or "misdemeanor." 
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Even so, other portions of the decision furnished consider-
able justification for the Committee's majority view, especially 
against the background of the oral argument. The Court had, 
for instance, come down heavily against a claim of absolute ex-
ecutive privilege "when the privilege depends solely on the broad, 
undifferentiated claim of public interest."36 The claim the Presi-
dent had made in resisting the Judiciary Committee's subpoenas 
was exactly of the same kind-a broad, undifferentiated claim of 
public interest. The Court had also stressed the "impediment that 
an absolute unqualified privilege would place in the way" of a 
criminal prosecution. 37 The dictum applies with at least equal 
force to the impediment the President's claim placed in the way 
of the Judiciary Committee proceeding, the proceeding which Mr. 
St. Clair himself had said was the exclusive proper mode of de-
termining presidential criminality. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
noted: "To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the 
function of courts that compulsory process be available for the 
production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the 
defense."38 How obtuse it would be not to see at once that, "to 
ensure that justice is done, it is [equally] imperati¥e to the func·tion 
of [the impeachment power] that compulsory process be available" 
to the House Judiciary Committee when it is acting under that 
unique authority. 
Thus, the opinion did indeed fortify the resolve of the J u-
diciary Committee and lent credence to its view; its own omission 
to have its own claim tested in the courts was brushed aside. In 
this additional way, the timing, unanimity, and ratio decidendi 
of United States v. Nixon compounded the difficulties the Presi-
dent was already facing in Congress. 
C. "The Mandate Shall Issue Forthwith" 
"Since this matter came before the Court during the pen-
dency of a criminal prosecution, and on representations that time 
is of the essence, the mandate shall issue forthwith."39 This last 
sentence, concluding the opinion in United States v. Nixon, seems 
utterly unnoteworthy. Yet, because of the sequel of events that 
fortuitously resulted from its issuance, the sentence must hold our 
attention in completing a description of the political effects of 
this case. To be sure, the effects of this bit of the case are less 
My own reservations to the precedental effect of what the Committee presumed 
to do in this respect appear in the October, 1974, issue of the A.B.A. Journal. 
36 94 S. Ct. at 3107. 
37 ld. 
38 ld. at 3108. 
39 Id. at 3111. 
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certain than any of the others, because their connection depends 
upon inferences that must be drawn from facts that are still very 
sketchy. A better history may need the personal memoirs of the 
Justices, of Judge Sirica, of Mr. St. Clair, and of Richard Nixon. 
But even this resume would be incomplete if it did not recall the 
impact of the Court's order as it has been felt even now. 
It is not common that Supreme Court decisions conclude by 
.laying down an order for an immediate mandate to issue, nor was 
it a foregone conclusion to suppose that the Court would do so in 
this instance. Again, there is the point that the proceedings in 
Judge Sirica's court might have an avoidable· effect on the House 
proceedings, and for this reason the Court might not compel im-
mediate disclosure. And while expedited review of the case may 
itself have been exactly right (the Court is surely persuasive that 
a President ought not have to be placed in contempt as a condi-
tion of having his constitutional claim tested in the Supreme 
Court, and the court of appeals had already issued a set of opin-
ions on the merits of his claim earlier in Nixon v. Sirica40 ), there 
was now, as of July 24, 1974, no similar urgency to hasten the 
district court proceeding. 
It was true that the trials of Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, 
Strachan, Parkinson, and Mardian had been previously scheduled 
for September 9th. But the climate of immediate publicity, the · 
likelihood of motions for postponement (which were subsequently 
made and refused, the trial date being finally confirmed for the 
end of September), plus Mr. St. Clair's previously announced 
view that it would require a great deal of time to review the ma-
terials to particularize specific objections, 41 all might have been 
weighed the other way. The narrow needs of justice did not self-
evidently require that the September 9th trial date be cast in con-
crete. If one were indifferent to the political desirability of wind-
ing up Watergate as expeditiously as possible to relieve the gen-
eral public anxiety and the immense distraction it had brought 
within Congress and the Presidency, it would be difficult to isolate 
the representations of the Special Prosecutor sufficient to persuade 
the Court that "time is of the essence." Certainly they are not 
noted in the opinion. 
Be that as it may, the mandate did issue forthwith, and within 
a week Judge Sirica established a timetable for submission of the 
materials. More significantly, as it turned out, he also required 
Mr. St. Clair personally to participate in the review of the tapes42 
40 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
41 N.Y. Times, July 10, 1974, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.). 
42 Id. July 27, 1974, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.). 
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-possibly from the judge's frustration at his inability to do any-
thing about two previously nonexistent tapes and an eighteen 
minute gap in another which a panel of experts had advised him 
was the result of several hand erasures. The insistance upon Mr. 
St. Clair's personal review might have been an appropri311:e pre-
caution, to make more certain than otherwise that Mr. St. Clair 
could, of his own personal knowledge, subsequently report 
whether all of the material subject to the Supreme Court's man-
date was included in the submission to the district court. 
On Monday, August 5th, the full consequences linked with 
these quickening developments became apparent when the Presi-
dent admitted that he had previously misstated the extent of his 
knowledge of the Watergate burglary, that he had in fact attempted 
to impede the F.B.I. inquiry, and that he had knowingly with-
held this information from the House Judiciary Committee as well 
as from his own counsel, contrary to his numerous earlier public 
statements.43 A story in the Washington Post the following day 
ventured an explanation for the President's wholly unexpected, 
and fatal, admission. 44 Claiming access to information from a 
suitably knowledgeable source, the story asserted that Mr. St. 
Clair had listened to a tape establishing these devastating facts. 
Resolving his ethical and legal responsibilities appropriately, Mr. 
St. Clair had allegedly advised the President that he would be 
forced to resign and to advise the district court of the truth of the 
matter, to avoid complicity in any continuing misrepresentation. 
The immediate effect on the impeachment proceedings (all 
previously dissenting members on the obstruction of justice article 
now came over), in the House, in the Senate, and on the President 
himself, is itself already history and there is surely no point be-
laboring it. Rather, what may be more appropriate here is sim-
ply to note how different one's assessment of an unprepossessing 
decision in the Supreme Court may be, depending upon the in-
terest one may have in understanding it. 
United States v. Nixon is not a remarkable case doctrinally. 
It breaks no new ground in the judicial review of executive priv-
ilege, and presumably will not be featured more than any of the 
other cases where the exceptional executive claims of Mr. Nixon 
(e.g., impoundment, surveillance, prior restraint on news publi-
cation) were turned aside without, however, significantly cutting 
back on any established doctdne of executive power. It is cer-
tainly not more noteworthy in its treatment of executive privilege, 
43 Jd., Aug. 6, 1974, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.). 
44 Washington Post, Aug. 6, 1974, at 1A, col. 5. 
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for instance, than Burr45 or than United States v. Reynolds. 46 To 
say that is was therefore not an important case, however, is to 
miss the larger point entirely. It is in the explanation of its most 
modest legal peculiarities that the most interesting questions are 
found. The decision's Marshallian unanimity, its timing, its ob-
lique encouragement to the impeachment proceedings, and even 
its concluding phrase (that "the mandate shall issue forthwith") 
significantly contributed to the first resignation of a President. 
It was, for all those reasons, truly an historic case. 
Ill. THE IRONY OF United States v. Nixon AS A GREAT CASE 
Virtually every student of constitutional law has had to come 
to terms with the realization that great cases are sometimes made 
so in spite of themselves. By far the most famous example is 
Marbury v. Madison/ 7 in which Chief Justice Marshall author-
itatively settled the Supreme Court's power of substantive con-
stitutional review, but only after preserving the opportunity to 
do so by a wholly avoidable interpretation of a federal statute 
enabling him to reach the question of the statute's constitution-
ality.48 
United States v. Nixon has an uncanny kinship with Mar-
bury v. Madison in this respect, although the substantive constitu-
tional issue (of executive privilege) was of course by no means 
of the same importance. Just as in Marbury, in United States v. 
Nixon the Supreme Court would have had no occasion to ex-
patiate on executive privilege had it not first resolved certain pre-
liminary issues in a manner enabling it to discuss the substantive 
issue. And precisely because the Court resolved those prelimin-
ary issues as it did, devoting the majority of its opinion to the sub-
stantive question of executive privilege which therefore seems to 
be the main feature of the case, it is easy (even as it was in 
Marbury) to gloss over the preliminary and subsidiary points. 
Exactly as one is inclined to think the Court clearly correct on 
the main question (and to think it important that the Court was 
able to reach that question), he is also likely to be beguiled by 
the Court's treatment of the lesser points of law. 
In United States v. Nixon, however, one of these lesser points 
45 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). 
46 345 u.s. 1 (1953). 
47 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
48 In Marbury, it was obvious that the Court could have construed the Act 
of Congress (§ 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789) to authorize writs of mandamus 
only in cases on appeal or within the original jurisdiction of the Court. Had the 
Court construed the statute in this way, it would entirely have avoided any ques-
tion as to whether Congress may authorize any cases to be brought originally in 
the Supreme Court apart from those specifically identified in article III of the 
Constitution. See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 
DUKE L.J. 1, 14-16. 
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of law is far from trivial. The implications that may flow from 
its ready acceptance are independently serious. As a consequence, 
however satisfied one may be politically with the case-that the 
Court not only decided well and correctly on the question of ex-
ecutive privilege, but that it would have been regrettable had the 
Court cast the case out on some mere procedural ground-it 
would be academically faithless to ignore the difficulty. 
That difficulty, in my view, is laid bare simply by asking, 
which of the following captions most accurately describes the 
point of controversy between the two parties? Was it in fact 
United States v. Richard Nixon, Jaworski v. Nixon, or Nixon v. 
Nixon? The point was raised by Mr. St. Clair, and we must look 
again at the adequacy of the Supreme Court's response: 
[Mr. Jaworski's] point of view is [that] he views himself as the 
United States as distinguished from a member of the execu-
tive branch. And in his brief he invokes the United States 
as really a fourth entity. Consitutionally, a Special Prosecu-
tor, with the power that my brother suggests he has, is a con-
stitutional anomaly. We have only three branches, not three-
and-a-third or three-and-half, or four. There is only one ex-
ecutive branch. And .the executive power is vested in a Presi-
dent.49 
The objection which Mr. St. Clair was advancing in this 
portion of his oral argument was incorrectly characterized by the 
Supreme Court as one of "justiciability," as the Court captioned 
that part of its opinion that rejected the argument. 50 If Mr. St. 
Clair's point is viewed simply as an objection to "justiciability," 
it is difficult to fault the Court's response in the penultimate par-
agraph to this section of the opinion: 
The demands of and the resistance to the subpoena pre-
sent an obvious controversy in the ordinary sense, but that 
alone is not sufficient to meet constitutional standards. In 
the constitutional sense, controversy means more than dis-
agreement and conflict; rather it means the kind of contro-
versy courts traditionally resolve. Here at issue is the pro-
duction or nonproduction of specified evidence deemed by the 
Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending 
criminal case. It is sought by one official of the Government 
within the scope of his express authority; it is resisted by the 
Chief Executive on the ground of his duty to preserve the con-
fidentiality of the communications of the President. What-
ever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are "of a 
type which .are ~traditionally justiciable." United States v. 
ICC, 337 U.S., at 430. The independent Special Prosecutor 
with his asserted need for the subpoenaed material in the un-
derlying criminal prosecution is opposed by the President with 
49 Record, supra note 15, at 67 (argument of Mr. St. Clair). 
oo 94 S. Ct. at 3100-02. 
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his steadfast assertion of privilege against disclosure of the 
materiaL This setting assures there is "that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens .the presentation of issues upon which the 
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitu-
tional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 204. More-
over, since the matter is one arising in the ·regular course of 
a federal criminal prosecution, it is within the traditional 
scope of Art. III power. 51 
Of course the issue was justiciable, but only if one abstracts "the" 
issue as though it were but an ordinary case where one party 
seeks the assistance of the court in the discovery of evidence in 
the custody of another who resists on some legal pretext. 
In its concluding paragraph to the same section, the Court 
attempted once again to characterize the objection Mr. St. Clair 
was seeking to advance, this time as an objection to the Special 
Prosecutor's "standing."52 Again, if this characterization is al-
lowed to pass, it is also difficult to fault the Court's response. 
The authorization pursuant to which Mr. Jaworski applied 
for judicial assistance to secure evidence from a reluctant party 
quite clearly and emphatically empowered him to seek such as-
sistance in the courts. 53 It was also correct (and utterly uncon-
tested) that that delegation of executive power "remained opera-
tive," i.e., that it had not been revoked. 54 It was equally clear 
(and equally uncontested) that no move had been made to remove 
Mr. Jaworski from the position of Special Prosecutor to which 
office the authority to seek such judicial assistance had been del-
egated. Consequently, there was no occasion to enter into any 
troubling discussion of whether, assuming the President and/or 
the Attorney General sought to fire Mr. Jaworski for any cause 
other than that for which the President and the Attorney General 
had previously provided, such discharge would have been inef-
fective. 55 Thus, authorization to seek assistance of the courts to 
secure evidence with respect to trials arising from the presidential 
election of 1972 was clear and uncontested. Since no claim had 
been made either that the authorization had been revoked or that 
Mr. Jaworski had himself been discharged, he of course had 
"standing." 
But neither of these Supreme Court characterizations of the 
51 /d. at 3102. 
52 /d. 
53 38 Fed. Reg. 32805 ( 1973). 
54 94 S. Ct. at 3101-02. Cj. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 
1973 ). 
55 Cf. Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. ,349 (1958); Humphrey's Ex'r v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602 ( 1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); 
Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 
(1941); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973). 
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issue even came close to the essential nature of Mr. St. Clair's 
objection. Only on page eight of the Court's opinion does the 
Court state the issue with approximate accuracy: 
Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and abso-
lute discretion to decide whether .to prosecute a case, Confis-
cation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869), United States v. Cox, 342 
F.2d 167, 171 (CAS), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), 
it is contended that a Presidenfs decision is final in deter-
mining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. 5 6 
This comes closer, but it is still inaccurate. Insofar as it de-
scribes the issue as being the supremacy of presidential author-
ity with respect to the use of evidence in a given criminal case, it 
states the matter too weakly. Obviously the judiciary itself has 
a separate interest regarding the use of evidence in a given crim-
inal case. Quite apart from determining m~tters of admissibility 
or excludability, a federal court might appropriately safeguard the 
judicial process from prosecutorial abuse even by the President, 
if the court were convinced that critical and admissible evidence 
had been withheld by the President to insure a verdict of "acquit-
tal" which might otherwise be utterly unwarranted. The federal 
courts need not cooperate as an independent agency of whitewash. 
But that question is not addressed in United States v. Nixon. 
Rather, the issue is whether "a President's decision is final" so far 
as a federal court is concerned with respect to the degrees of assist-
ance a federal court shall presume to provide in securing evidence 
solely on behalf of executive interests, when it becomes manifest 
to the court that the President of the United States has personally 
concluded that the executive interest of the United States would 
not be well served by the issuance of process by the court, and 
when the President of the United States has communicated his 
view directly to the court itself. This is a different, far more dif-
ficult issue. It is not resolved by any of the cases relied upon by 
the Court.57 Implicit in United States v. Nixon is a decision on 
56 94 S. Ct. at 3100 (emphasis added). 
57 In Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), the Supreme Court 
held that private rights may vest by force of an extant regulation, assuming even 
that no statute required the issuance of that regulation and that the regulation 
may at any moment be revoked. The same proposition is reaffirmed in Vitarelli 
v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) and Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). 
Neither of these cases in any way involved a controversy between conflicting 
assertions by the President of the United States and some other officer as to 
whose representation of a purely executive interest should be deemed controlling 
by the court in which such conflicting assertions were made. 
In United States v. I.C.C., 337 U.S. 426 (1949), the principle of presidential 
executive supremacy similarly had nothing to do with the case. In brief, the 
United States brought suit in district court seeking relief as a shipper of goods. 
Its complaint, brought by the Attorney General, was that the rates charged by a 
railroad were improper, and that the ICC had erred as a matter of law in its 
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this question, of course, but not a decision accompanied by a line 
of reasoning or explanation that can yield an abiding conviction 
that the decision was right. 
The question is important because it involves a challenge 
to the supremacy of presidential authority in the determination 
of purely executive interests sought to be advanced through ap-
plications for judicial assistance over the contrary determination 
of lesser officials. Viewed in this manner, the Court's decision in 
United States v. Nixon may inadvertently support a proposition 
that Congress may divide up and "particle-ize" the executive 
power of the United States. I cannot believe that the Court 
meant to do so. 
Among the specific executive powers enumerated in article 
II of the Constitution is that "he shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed."58 The Supreme Court's reference to United 
States v. Cox59 itself supports the view that the judiciary has no 
separate superintending authority as to what cases shall be brought 
by the executive, or what evidence shall be sought by the execu-
tive. The "he" referred to in article II is the President, a unitary 
office, deliberately selected to be unitary against alternative pro-
posals advanced in Convention in 1787, and enacted into ex-
press language: "The executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent . . . ."60 
administrative adjudication denying the government's claim and denying relief. 
The ICC appeared through its own counsel in defense of the Commission's judg-
ment, and the railroad also appeared against the United States as intervenor. 
"Case or controversy" elements of article III thus being satisfied in every prac-
tical way, the Supreme Court held that the superficial anomaly that the Attorney 
General was also required by statute to appear nominally "for the Government 
as a statutory defendant," was neither a statutory nor article III bar to the suit. 
The case may well have been appropriate for the Supreme Court to cite in 
United States v. Nixon as a first step in determining the Special Prosecutor's 
"standing" to have applied for a subpoena, but it is without value as to whether 
his representation of an exclusively executive interest (i.e., whether judicial assist-
ance should be sought to secure evidence for a prosecutive use) may be preempted 
by the President of the United States, once the President himself makes a direct as-
sertion in court as Chief Executive that that assistance by the court is not only not 
desired, but that he affirmatively opposes it. United States v. I.C.C. said nothing 
whatever, of course, as to whether the President of the United States might have 
authoritatively pre-empted the Attorney General in district court by entering aq 
appearance on his own behalf, as Chief Executive, to move that the proceeding 
should be dismissed. Had he done so, the Court would then have had occasion 
to determine whether anything other than a purely executive interest was in-
volved, a question not deemed necessary to consider at the time at all. The 
President had made no such assertion. 
58 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
59 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). 
60 The decision to establish a single, rather than plural executive was 
reached early in the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention. 1 RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 64-97 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). See a/so C. WARREN, 
THE MAKING OF THE CoNSTITUTION 1973-85 (1928). Commentaries by pro-
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There is, however, no need to derive from this conventional 
wisdom the insufferable conclusion that no particle of the execu-
tive power can be delegated in whatever manner the President 
might choose, any more than it would be appropriate to suppose 
that Congress cannot delegate any particle of the legislative power 
to quasi independent regulatory agencies, with an authorized, al-
beit interstitial, rule-making power of their own. The point is 
not to revisit the delegation cases, but to distinguish them. Bear-
ing in mind that "it is a constitution we are expounding,"61 it 
does not derogate from the function of a unitary executive power 
as it relates to the principle of presidential executive supremacy 
to suppose that the President may very well require the full-time 
assistance of other, subordinate officers for whom Congress may 
make provision and to whom the President may commit some 
portion of the executive power. 62 
Constitution spokesmen during the ratification debates link the preference for a 
singular executive to a desire for energetic, responsible administration of the laws 
by an independent branch: 
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, ac-
tivity, secrecy and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings 
of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of 
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these 
qualities will be diminished. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472 (Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). Subsequent re-
affirmation of the unity principles may be found in the famous protest message of 
Andrew Jackson, 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 69, 79 (J. Richard-
son ed. 1896), and in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). These au-
thorities, as qualified by later distinguishable judicial approval of administrative 
agencies, seem to support the view summarized by Professor Edward S. Corwin: 
"The Constitution knows only one executive power, that of the President whose 
duty to 'take care that the laws are faithfully executed' becomes the equivalent of 
the duty to execute them himself, according to his construction of them." E. 
CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 84 (2d ed. 1957). 
61 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis 
added). 
62 Cf. I.C.C. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), sustaining an act of Con-
gress making it "the duty of any district attorney of the United States to whom 
the Commission may apply to institute in the proper court and to prosecute under 
the direction of the Attorney General of the United States all necessary proceed-
ings for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act .... " Id. at 461. In his 
editorial in the New York Times Professor Bator comments: 
Does this mean chaos, with no control over who may appear in 
court on behalf of the Government? Of course not. The authority of 
a given official to bring suit on behalf of the United States must be duly 
conferred by law. And the President can keep order through his consti-
tutional prerogative to hire and fire. 
P. Bator, Disputing Mr. St. Clair on the Jurisdictional Issue, N.Y. Times, May 
30, 1974, at 37, col. 1 (city ed.) (emphasis added). There are several difficulties 
with this approach. The first is that it would preserve presidential supremacy 
over purely executive decisions only by the awkward device of Myers v. United 
States, i.e., by enacting the spoils systems into constitutional law, insofar as it 
implies that the President could not be denied an authority to dismiss a United 
States attorney since that is the one way he "can keep order." 
It is too limited insofar as it would require the President to fire a U.S. attor-
ney outright even when he does not wish to do so, and where it would be quite 
sufficient from the President's point of view to leave the U.S. attorney unmolested 
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It may be seriously questioned, however, whether Congress 
may particle-ize the executive power by attempting to lodge a 
power of executive finality in any such office or officer, i.e., the 
power to determine what constitutes "the" executive interest of the 
United States, and a power to render that determination conclusive 
in any forum, foreign or domestic, without regard to any contrary 
representation by the President of the United States of his own view 
of that executive interest. No answer is provided by the fact that 
Congress may vest the power to appoint "inferior" executive officers 
outside the Presidency, by force of special constitutional provi-
in his position while being free to assert authoritatively in federal court his own 
authority as Chief Executive that, as President, he does not deem the executive 
interest to be advanced in a particular case through any assistance the federal 
court might otherwise be authorized to provide. The necessity of firing the U.S. 
attorney outright requires more of the President than the President's own view 
of the appropriate exercise of executive restraint even while forcing him to an 
extreme act which may be far more demoralizing to executive professionals and 
simultaneously inhibiting to the President by creating an unnecessary political 
controversy with Congress. It is likewise too drastic as the outright discharge of 
the U.S. attorney is clearly inessential to maintain the superordination of 
presidential authority in determining the extent to which judicial assistance 
shall be sought in behalf of exclusively executive interests. The Myers "remedy" 
of enacting the spoils system into constitutional law was rightly trimmed by 
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
The other difficulty with this approach is that Professor Bator does not in 
fact believe in it. His view apparently is that even this one mode of executive 
superintendency may itself be cut off by the simple expedient of Congress vesting 
the power of appointment in some federal court, while simultaneously restricting 
the power of removal as Congress alone sees fit. See, Hearings on H.J. Res. 784 
& H.R. 10937 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 18, at 334-38 ( 1973) (testimony of P. 
Bator), relying upon Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). See also United 
States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), noted by Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126-27 (1926). But see Kendall v. United States, 
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524,610 (1838): 
[T]he proceeding has been treated as an infringement upon the executive 
department of the government; which has led to a very extended range 
of argument on the independence and duties of that department; but 
which, according to the view taken by the Court of the case, is entirely 
misapplied. . . . The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the 
postmaster-general in the discharge of any official duty, partaking in 
any respect of an executive character . . . . 
One additional, critical, distinction should be noted. Insofar as a regulatory 
agency is in significant part an agent of Congress, chosen by Congress as its 
means of perfecting Congress's own legislation, i.e., promulgating rules that per-
fect Congress's legislative "intention" and to represent its will in establishing the 
exact legislative norm, it is not illogical that Congress may, pursuant to the neces-
sary-and-proper clause, also provide that its legislative interest shall be repre-
sented by professional counsel attached to its own agency. From this point of 
view, the principle of presidential executive supremacy may not be a sufficient 
basis for the President to presume to pre-empt the agency's own counsel in court, 
at least where issues are present calling into question the consistency of the regu-
lation with the authorization and intention of Congress. In that respect, the con-
troversy is not "intra-departmental" at all, but inter-departmental. In United 
States v. Nixon, however, there is no suggestion that the interest which Mr. 
Jaworski was representing was anything other than a purely executive one. 
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sion, 63 or that it may, aided by that provision, secure to such offi-
cers some degree of tenure and professional security such officers 
might otherwise lack. 64 Indeed, acceptance of that clause may 
more logically imply that precisely to the extent that the authority 
to appoint and remove such persons may be placed outside the ex-
ecutive spoils system, derogating from the executive power to that 
salutary extent, it would be absurd to treat that clause as though it 
were an oblique and disingeneous way of also granting to Con-
gress the wholly different and more ominous power to particle-ize 
the executive power by smuggling in a power of executive finality 
to be exercised by all such persons. 
Moreover, Myers v. United States65 may well be incorrect, 
as it is certainly debatable whether the Constitution enacted the 
spoils system, i.e., reposed an ungovernable removal power in the 
President over all even purely executive offices, down through 
and below local postmasters. But while Congress may be able 
to provide tenure even for exclusively executive officers, at least 
at subcabinet levels of responsibility, 66 to preserve the separation 
of power it may be all the more necessary to hold that that power 
is wholly without prejudice to the President's power of executive 
supremacy in respect to the purely executive finality of their de-
cisons. It is a contrived logic which confuses constitutional pro-
visions respecting congressional power over appointments and re-
movals with the principle of presidential supremacy in the final 
determination of purely executive interests. Wherever that logic 
is admitted, the argument becomes circular. If one insists that 
the power to provide for the appointment and removal of an "in-
ferior" officer also carries with it the power to provide for the 
constitutional finality of any (article II) executive decision that 
such person may make, the officer is, to that extent, not an "in-
ferior" officer at all-and thus the clause is inoperative. 67 Only 
to the extent that the supererogatory authority of the President of 
the United States is left free to assert itself (in any instance when 
the President resolves the proper use of article II in some manner 
contrary to the initial determination of another) can it fairly be 
said that, in respect to that power, the other person is truly an 
"inferior" officer. 
This incidentally, is the principal objection to the several 
proposals to establish a "separate" office of Special Prosecutor 
63 U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2. 
64 See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 ( 1886). 
65 272 u.s. 52 (1926). 
66 Id. at 240 (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
67 See discussion in note 62 supra. 
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with some power of article II executive finality. 68 That Congress 
may provide for such an office seems likely. That it can do 
more, i.e., that it can also vest in such office a power of execu-
tive finality controlling in the courts against the President of the 
United States in any opposing assertions of what shall be deemed 
the authoritative expression of the purely executive (article II) 
interests of the United States, seems to me most doubtful. 69 Oth-
erwise, I do not see any clear stopping point at all as to how far 
Congress may dismember the executive power, reducing the ef-
fective authority of the President personally to the chore that "he 
shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the 
State of the Union," and placing every significant element of ex-
68 Following the "Saturday Night Massacre," H.R. 11401 was introduced on 
November 12, 1973, to provide for appointment of a Special Prosecutor by a 
three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
Pursuant to the proposed resolution, the Special Prosecutor would have had 
"exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute in the name of the United 
States ... all offenses arising out of the 1972 Presidential election for which the 
Special Prosecutor deems it necessary and appropriate to assume responsibility," 
and "allegations of offenses involving the President, [and] members of the White 
House staff, or Presidential appointees." The Special Prosecutor's proposed term 
was to be three years, subject only to "the sole and exclusive power" of the 
appointing judicial panel to remove him. See, Hearings on H.J. Res. 784 & 
H.R. 10937 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 18, at 487-96 (1973). 
Nearly all of the debate on this Resolution was highly tangential, however, 
because it was preoccupied with the task of assuring job security to the Special 
Prosecutor, rather than being concerned with the executive finality of such deci-
sions as he would be expected to make in the exercise of purely executive power. 
Thus, the debate largely centered on the question of whether the office of Special 
Prosecutor was (in light of his proposed responsibilities) an "inferior" office 
within the meaning of article II, section 2, clause 2, which permits Congress to 
vest the appointment (and removal) of "such inferior officers" outside the Presi-
dency. Additionally, the question was debated as to whether (assuming the pro-
posed office would be an inferior one), the power of appointment (and removal) 
could be vested "in the courts of law" (namely, the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia) rather than in "the heads of departments" (namely, 
the Attorney General as head of the Department of Justice), even though the 
office would be an executive one, rather than a judicial one. 
Interesting as these questions were, they did not reach the very different and 
far more central issue. That issue is simply whether there is anything anywhere 
in the Constitution which grants the Congress the power to assign to any such 
officer an additional and extraordinary authority of executive finality in exclusion 
of the unitary superordinate executive authority of the President. Article II, 
section 2, clause 2 does not on its face purport to say anything. to that effect at 
all, of course. Nor can one find anything in the very modest original convention 
discussion of this clause (or in its own structure and relationship to other clauses) 
that does so. 
69 Most helpful on this question are the views of Professors Freund and. 
Bator, and of Dean Cramton. See, Hearings on the Special Prosecutor Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 345 (1973) 
(testimony of P. Freund); id. at 356-57 (testimony of R. Cramton). See also 
Hearings on H.J. Res. 784 & H.R. 10937 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Jus-
tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 18, at 335 
(1973) (testimony of P. Bator). 
1974] UNITED STATES v. NIXON 139 
ecutive power in the hands of individuals made more accountable 
to Congress (or to the courts, or to no one at all) but in any 
event in clear derogation of executive presidential supremacy. 
Support for the effort was urged in committee hearings on the 
maxim that "we do well to remember that it is a Constitution we 
are expounding."70 Possibly, but not, I think, the one we have. 
In spite of the understandable alarm so recently expressed 
about the growth of presidential power, 71 however, United States 
v. Nixon ought not be regarded as a precedent in derogation of 
the principle of presidential executive supremacy. The opinion 
for the Court did not address the issue as such, and neither set 
of briefs clearly framed the issue in these terms. The issue was 
buried and lost, subsumed in the mere determination of the Spe-
cial Prosecutor's standing to sue and the justiciability of his claim. 
Having established to its satisfaction that the Special Prose-
cutor did have standing and that the issue was justiciable, the 
Court lapsed into the error of treating the President merely as 
any other adversary resisting a subpoena duces tecum, albeit on 
grounds peculiar to him as President, i.e., executive privilege. 
What it omitted ~to do (as the district court failed also to do) was 
to raise the question in the following way: When the President 
of the United States authoritatively communicates to a federal 
dictrict court that in his view the issuance of judicial process is 
not desired on behalf of any executive interest of the United 
States, is it not obvious that his determination as Chief Executive 
necessarily supercedes any contrary assertion by any. other party 
when the only basis claimed for issuance of that process is an as-
serted executive function? 
Adherence to the principle of presidential executive suprem-
acy does not require that the President be prohibited from freely 
delegating portions of the executive power to such offices and of-
ficers as Congress may provide. Rather, the principle is pre-
served intact simply in observing that at every moment presiden-
tial executive supremacy still operates with respect to all portions of 
the executive power thus delegated. Without presuming to dis-
charge such officers, moreover, and without presuming ~to revoke 
their general authority (neither of which may be constitutionally 
desirable to imagine as· the sole means of preserving presidential 
executive supremacy, and both of which the Congress may in 
some measure restrict), the President may at any time declare his 
own view of the executive interest which thereby becomes con-
70 Id. 
71 See, e .. g., A. ScHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
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trolling in court, in foreign relations, or in any other forum where 
the question might arise. 72 
Is there, then, no check at all upon the President for great 
abuses he may make of that power? But of course. The House 
and the Senate may satisfy themselves that the President's execu-
tive determination of the best interests of the United States was 
influenced by motives or purposes so corrupt and reprehensible-
or that his supererogatory assertion of executive supremacy con-
stituted so gross an abuse of his own power-that they are exactly 
what the Constitution meant for Congress to police through its 
powers of impeachment and removal. The Constitution, how-
ever, nowhere appears to commit to Congress the very different 
power to avoid the President's paramount executive authority so 
long as he remains Chief Executive, by presuming to find it "un-
satisfactory" and thereupon taking it from him, to place it in 
another. 
On balance, I believe that while Mr. Jaworski was entitled 
(by statute) to utilize the name of "The United States" in seeking 
the subpoenas, insofar as the sole interest of the United States 
he had standing to advance was purely an executive one, the case 
in fact was Jaworski v. Nixon, the issue was "who is constitu-
tionally superior in the controlling representation of a purely ex-
ecutive interest in the federal courts," and ironically, on the mer-
its of that question the President had all the better of it. 
72 Insofar as United States v. Nixon may (implicitly?) hold that the only 
means by which a President may constitutionaily assert his executive supremacy 
in the courts is by first either firing the officer with whom he disagrees, or by 
first revoking his authority, I can only suggest, respectfuily, that the Court is 
incorrect. But it is far more likely that the Court simply was never encouraged 
to see the issue correctly in the first place. 
What made it hard to see was the peculiarity that the substance of the 
President's assertion of superior executive determination (as to whether, in his 
view, any appropriate executive interest of the United States would be served by 
issuance of district court process) was obscured by its form. The objection was 
not forthrightly put in these terms. Rather, the President appeared to be con-
testing issuance of process solely as an adversary (rather than as an executive 
superior), and solely on the different ground of "executive privilege." Like the 
Court, some commentators also assumed, therefore, that the Preside.nt's power of 
executive supremacy simply went "unexercised." See, e.g., Albert & Simon, En-
forcing Subpoenas Against the President: The Question of Mr. Jaworski's Au-
thority, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 550-52 (1974). 
But an examination of the executive privilege claim itself should have made 
plain to the court that it was intrinsic to the claim that, in the President's view, 
the executive interests of the United States would be better served by not issuing 
process for the materials, than by issuing that process. It was therefore not at 
ail as though the President had merely made some public speech to that effect. 
Rather, through counsel, in court, formally, the President had expressed his will 
directly. Ct. Albert & Simon supra. 
